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Decades of military intervention of US in Afghanistan failed to establish its ambition of liberal democratic institutions successfully. Not only this, it could not check the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan for establishing a social order that could free Afghanistan from falling prey into the hands of corrupted leaders backed by their allies. The Taliban aspires to build a social order that could be placed on Islamic traditions and practices that they believe are misused by the corrupted leaders of Afghanistan.[1] The Taliban’s seizure of Kabul came to the place on August 15, 2021, that led to their strong foothold over the country. It came in the response as US was completing its military mission that it concluded in the February 2020 in U.S.-Taliban accord. Finally, it was on August 30, 2021, when U.S. military and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan came to an end after the departure of U.S. combats from Afghanistan that changed the security situation in the country[2] India’s former security adviser M.K. Narayanan while opining on the changing security situation in Afghanistan writes, “Due to its geographical positioning and influence on regional stability, the political future of Afghanistan will be of considerable significance to several nations with competing sets of interests as well as to pan-Asian relations as a whole.”. Thus, the neighboring countries along with India will receive the security implications that can emanate from the Afghanistan after the Taliban resurgence. India considers the importance of peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan favorable for security in Kashmir and a prerequisite to the protection of its ongoing developmental projects in the country[3] as well as to its ambition of emerging out as a regional leader along with its power projection as a major global power.[4] Against this backdrop, the India’s active engagement with Afghanistan since from 9/11 through the developmental initiatives has raised some of the pertinent questions. Can India’s economic engagement sustain keeping in view Taliban takeover of Afghanistan? What political strategy is maneuvered by India after Taliban resurgence? How India is going to balance its interests in Afghanistan amidst of the presence of the Pakistan. Such questions are being answered in this research paper. The paper impinges on Taliban resurgence and its impact on India, and relies on the material from both primary and secondary sources. [5]

The available literature on Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan- Assessing India’s strategies is limited and in the form of newspaper articles. Also, most of the India-Afghanistan relations are analyzed while keeping in view the Pakistan factor. Candidate has provided a description of following two books regarding India’s strategies in Afghanistan.

Avinashi Paliwal, (2017) My Enemy’s Enemy.

The book provides a description about how India as a global rising power engages itself in South Asia in general and with Afghanistan in particular right from the Soviet invasion and up to the ongoing US withdrawal. Central to the debate is the containment of Pakistan, the country, which is believed as a key factor behind India’s Afghan policy. The author also gives an account of description about the Afghanistan’s internal dynamics that is the central reason to its conflict. The book also brings forth reveals the debate on Taliban Dilemma that existed between Partisans and Conciliators within the policy corridors of India. The Conciliators  who were in favour of ‘Engage with all’ dictum, reflecting their pragmatic stance in reaching to Pakistan for Afghan conundrum. While on the other hand, Partisans approach was against it, reflecting the containment of Pakistan. Along with it, the book focuses on changing strategies of India towards Afghanistan, keeping in view, the Soviet invasion, years of Taliban regime and ongoing US withdrawal. However, the book does not provide a detailed description on India’s policy reformulations, keeping in view the changing security scenario in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal from the country.

Harsh V Pant, “India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implication,” in India in Africa and Afghanistan ed. Cameron Buzatto.

The work signifies the reassessment of policies by the regional players who find their stakes in Afghanistan including India, keeping in view, the changes that have taken place in the western strategy towards Afghanistan. Central argument of the work reflects that India’s policy towards Afghanistan has remained in a changing trajectory since 2001. In addition to it, the work provides an insight how New Delhi has responded to a strategic environment that is shaped by the involvement of other actors in the region. What is more, the book takes a note of the fact that ISAF is preparing to leave the country and is in the middle of a pull out which evokes a concern in India to preserve its interests in Afghanistan. However, the book falls short of the policy options that India should take if the regional solution to the Afghan problem fails. Such a gap is addressed by the ongoing study which attempts to provide a description about the policy options that should be carried by India in Afghanistan after US draw down.

Brief Background: India’s engagement with Afghanistan

Both India and Afghanistan are sharing historical and cultural bonds dating back at least to the Indus Valley civilization. Such ties were institutionalized by the signing of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1951.[6]After the withdrawal of Soviets from the country in 1989, the region was held in a state of civil war that went on in between different Mujahideen factions who wanted to gain the power position. India’s support at that time went in favor of Northern Alliance along with Russia and Iran against the strong foothold and advances of Taliban. So, India’s involvement in Afghanistan from the period of 1996-2001 remained covert for the reason Afghanistan was held in the clutches of Taliban rule which India views as antithetical to its domestic security.[7] However, India remained rigorously active in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 through its soft and smart power initiatives which were clearly manifested in the ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’[8] that both India and Afghanistan signed in 2011 backed by the US pressure on India. What is worth to mention here, Pakistan was used as a frontline state by the US in its ‘Global War on Terror’; due to which Pakistan time and again gained a strategic leverage in the multiple negotiations with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan.[9] India’s active engagement in the country in the meantime was also driven by the India’s striking capabilities in terms of political, economic and military dimensions. Afghanistan provided a space for this aspiring global power to enhance its security parameters and increase its sphere of influence over external environment. Calculating India’s course of relations since 9/11 one founds a changing trajectory that divides the said course of relations into three distinct phases.[10]In the phase first, India extended aid-receptive programmes to Afghanistan for institution building, capacity creation, and infrastructure development in reference to social, education and government sector projects for that India invested USD 2billion. Therefore, it can be said that India engaged itself with Afghanistan through soft power initiatives that generated goodwill among Afghan people for India and helped her to develop a state identity and strategic narratives as a rising global power.[11]In the phase second, power equation shifted in the hands of Pakistan and its allies and New Delhi stood marginalized. Thus, India faced a risky track at this juncture, this was the outcome, when west got diverted by its war in Iraq and had to withdraw some of its forces from Afghanistan. This paved a way to Taliban in claiming the strategic space back that it was enjoying earlier.[12] In Phase third a historic pact called-The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) was signed between the two countries on October 2011. Such a development signifies that India had to rethink over its engagement with Afghanistan keeping in view the changing security scenario in that country because of U.S. announcement of troops draw-down by 2014. The signing of 2011 Strategic Agreement is counted as a great shift in India’s policy attitude towards Afghanistan as it released India on having restraint on security matters and on holding the exclusive focus on development to a greater security engagement. Such an engagement reflects the fact that India lifted its focus from soft power and shifted it to Smart power initiatives in that country. Therefore, it can be said that SPA has played a critical role in shaping Afghanistan’s future in coordination with India and this pact reflects the increased India-Afghanistan bilateral relations from 2011-2014 and from 2014-2017, keeping in view the exit strategy of US from the country. The former is marked by the formalization of Strategic Partnership Agreement and latter by the continuation of the said pact.[13]

Drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan and Establishment of Taliban’s office in Qatar

Obama administration’s announcement of troops draw-down from Afghanistan by 2014 raised the concerns among the countries of the region including India. Such a decision was likely to change the security situation in Afghanistan and the regions adjacent.[14] Surrounded with the top military leaders at the White House, Obama declared that the security situation in Afghanistan is “precarious” and the presence of Taliban in Afghanistan he says is a threat. He affirms the fact that he was committed against any group that will put Afghanistan into violence and will use it “as a safe haven for terrorists to attack our nation again.” Furthermore He declared that “It is in our national security interest-especially after all the blood and treasure we’ve invested in Afghanistan over years-that we give our Afghan partners the very best opportunity to succeed.”However, the president affirmed for the greater focus on “training and advising” Afghan security forces in order to gain their momentum in counterterrorism operations against the left behind of the terrorist organization like al-Qaida that US believes has attacked it on September 11.[15] It was in the meantime that Taliban established its office in, Doha Qatar, in order to hold the peace talks with the parties to end the Afghanistan conflict. The Taliban spokesperson Mohammad Naeem declared that one of the main aims of this decision was to “meet Afghans”. The main parties to the peace process are the Government of Afghanistan along with its High Peace Council that was established in 2010 with the intent to look for Taliban and to join them in peace process with U.S. In the process of this peace deal Pakistan is considered to play an important role as it acts as a mediator between the Afghanistan government and Taliban.[16]

Peace agreement between U.S. and Taliban: India’s Stand

It was in February 29, 2020 that a peace deal was signed between the U.S. and Taliban after the months of negotiations in Doha, Qatar that guarantees the full withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Afghanistan however based on certain conditions that provides a possibility for America to end its eighteen years of war from there. The “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” brings with it certain commitments on the Intra-Afghan dialogue, “a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire”, Counterterrorism and troop’s level. However, it has been said by Pompeo who is United States secretary of the state that “Theirs is a great deal of hard work ahead on the diplomatic front.” The agreement signifies that the Taliban “will start intra-Afghan negotiations with Afghan sides on March 10, 2020,” in Oslo, Norway. Meanwhile, it is observed that India did not extend its support to U.S. in finalizing the agreement with the Taliban and did not recognize its stand for legitimizing the group as a political actor.[17] India perceives the group as pro-Pakistan, although a state of stress is being noticed in the Pakistan-Taliban relations. Not only this, India also shows tolerance to other militant groups operating in Afghanistan whom India recognizes hostile to its interests. As a result, India took its side with Kabul government and did not participate in the U.S-Taliban peace talks even though receiving requests from former President Hamid Karzai. So, India seems interested in favor of an Afghan government that should be inclusive and pluralistic.[18]

Taliban back for second time: How India is responding

As Kabul felled again in the hands of Taliban on 15 August 2021 and has completed its six months in power on February 15, 2022. The situation in Afghanistan is time and again worse under the shadows of Taliban. None of the countries around globe has provided recognition to this regime including Pakistan who has withheld his stand officially. India being concerned about its national security has not provided any positive signal for recognizing Taliban rule. However, it is being noticed that New Delhi has added some sort of flexibility in its approach towards Taliban as is evident from the fact that India has showed its presence in several negotiations that were going on in between Taliban and US over peace deal with the intent to address its security concerns that are going to emanate from Afghan soil, and is committed to its all time stand of continuing people-to-people exchanges. Therefore, it did not lag behind in providing emergency humanitarian assistance to the nation.[19]It was also observed that the country stood cooperative to the Afghan refugees particularly with the Hindu and Sikh minorities as New Delhi’s MEA has asserted that it will facilitate the said communities in Afghanistan, however would such a stand welcome all the Afghans is yet undecided.[20]

Earlier stated by Taneja that India’s responses to the changing power matrix in Afghanistan resembles to the strategy that it adopted when Taliban gained its power in 1996 up to 2001. At that time, India along with other nations like Iran chooses to extend its support in favor of Northern Alliance. Once again, India’s engagement with the persona from the said coalition and others that sideline themselves from Taliban seems appearing on the ground.[21]Not only this, India mobilized the Afghanistan’s western neighbors, who together share the common concern that Taliban should be motivated not to support the terrorist organizations in its neighborhood. Along with it, India remained active in the resolutions backed by it in UN Security Council for ensuring that government in Kabul led by Taliban should not be provided with the membership of UN, keeping in view the Taliban’s support to some terrorist organizations. In addition to it, India also mobilized the Central Asian Republics along with Iran and Russia to work out a strategy for the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan. Such an imitative is evident from the fact when the said countries together attended a meeting in pursuit of this common cause and to motivate the Taliban for the establishment of more inclusive form of government in the country. Furthermore, the safeguard to the human rights of the ethnic minorities along with the women were also discussed in the agenda of the meeting. Parthsarthy analyses that in such a volatile situation, India has joined itself with the international community to endorse a two-track approach in which primary attention is given to the sufferings of common people. Therefore, India has supplied the 50, 000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan across the Wagah-Attari border along with it, India has also supplied six tons of medicinal supplies through airlifting.[22] The Pakistan has this time informed India that it will allow its humanitarian assistance transportation through its territory on the precondition that only Afghan trucks will carry it.[23]

India has also worked to receive the recommendations from the several countries on Afghan conundrum, for that matter it has hosted a regional security dialogue which was held on November, 2021. This meeting was attended by seven other nations including Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. However, both China and Pakistan refrained from attending the meeting as China mentioned that it had scheduling issues while Pakistan blamed India as ‘spoiler of peace’. The first two dialogues of the meeting were earlier held in Russia and Iran in 2018 and 2019.What is worth to mention here is that India has not invited the present government in Afghanistan that is led by Taliban as it does not recognize the group as the legitimate authority. While as the Taliban on the other hand has extended a note of appreciation for India in carrying out such efforts in series till now. This meeting signals that India is having a leadership role in reaching out to the regional solution for Afghan problem and the threats that are emanating from it. Pant says that such a role played by India is not going to bring immediate results but will help India to shape the strategic conversation over the issue in the region and will provide a clear picture about its priorities. At the end of this dialogue, the participating countries adopted the ‘Delhi Declaration’.[24] Also, taking into consideration the views of D’ Souza here who is having an expertise over Afghan issues suggests that India has to adopt a ‘Pragmatic and astute’ policy for its engagement with Taliban so as to secure a conducive environment for its ongoing aid and development programmes for the Afghans so that it can avoid the humanitarian crisis within that country.[25]

India’s challenges for now

Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan is going to change the geo-political dynamics in the region. The security threats that can emanate from Afghanistan’s current situation and their spillover effect to the countries like China, Russia, and India along with CAR’ is the common concern that these nations share. However, the countries on their individual front are looking to shift the changing dynamics in Afghanistan into their favor. In such a changing security scenario, Afghanistan-Pakistan-China axis is also going to create a policy coordination that could be antithetical to the India. China has its economic stakes in Afghanistan and will look for its projects to get done. It is more concerned about its transnational Belt and Road Initiative-the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that it does not want to get affected by the Taliban insurgents and wants Afghanistan to be included in the same project.[26]Pakistan also stays desirous for the successful operationalisation of this project and seems interested to make itself the part of such connectivity so as to fulfill the geo-economic dreams to get done the prospectus of ‘New Great Game’ in Afghanistan. Moreover, China has provided positive signals to Taliban for conducting business with them. It wants Taliban not to provide a support to the insurgents that are operating in its Uyghur valley of Xinjiang province. Both China and Taliban seem reciprocating to each other by their responses, as is evident from the statement of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar who is Afghanistan’s new first deputy prime minister confirming China a “trustworthy friend”. On the other end, Pakistan is maneuvering its strategies in Afghanistan that seem more or less against to Indian interests. It is Pakistan through which US channeled its funding for the creation of Taliban against the Soviets during 1996. M.K. Narayanan opines that Pakistan has emerged as ‘patron saint’ of new Taliban government in Afghanistan. He further reiterates that Islamabad along with Beijing and Moscow are the main supporters of Taliban regime. Meanwhile, it is being analyzed that Russia also wants to increase its influence in the region thus is found to be the supporter of China-Pak axis against the US influence in the area. However it has not provided recognition to present Taliban regime due to her concern that the insurgents could infiltrate in the surrounding countries of Russia that will trigger the chances of terrorism. Therefore, any closeness between China and Pakistan along with Afghanistan based on the convergence of their interests creates a concern for India that it has to balance.[27]

Taliban’s preparations for setting a cabinet and its decision to provide a place to the persons from the Haqqanis faction who are believed to have their close ties with Pakistan and are dominated by the ideology of having belief in global jihad has faded the hopes of many Indians that there could emerge a less fundamentalist Taliban than that which existed and ruled the Afghanistan in the 1990’s. As is also reiterated by Kabir Taneja, “It is a massive strategic victory for Pakistan to have a Taliban administration over which they have quasi-control,” He believes that it is now great opportunity for Pakistan to maneuver anything that it wants to have in Afghanistan. So, such a situation creates much challenging position to India in the coming years.[28]Notwithstanding the fact, London who was a former counter-terrorism chief across south and south-west Asia opines that there are certain issues between Taliban and Pakistan on which both are showing resistance including the recognition of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Talking about the Afghan population, he further goes on saying that they are showing resentments about Pakistan’s interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Some Taliban prisoners in Pakistani Jails that were being arrested on the recommendations of US are also the ones who are not happy with the Pakistan. So, Taliban more or less wants to be more independent in their state affairs and what suits better to them for sharing the power position in Afghanistan. But what London concludes is that such a situation is not going to be positive for India as Pakistan was acting as a constraint factor over Taliban in controlling them from taking any such decision that could prove detrimental to the collective security of the region. Next to it, Taliban is believed to have their ties with the Lashkar-i-Toiba and Jaish-i-Mohammad, the groups that are fighting for Kashmir issue against India in Kashmir- a Muslim dominated region. Some in India expresses their concern that Taliban inclination to the Muslim brotherhood may aggravate the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir. Albeit, the security laws of Indian government for counter insurgency are much comprehensive.

Adding the views of Avinash Paliwal to the ongoing debate, he reflects that Taliban considers India a strong driver to counterbalance the influence of Pakistan over them. He opines that Taliban was interested in developing its relationship with India since its first takeover of Afghanistan, and both the two were maneuvering on it though covertly and was not coming to the surface due to the Taliban’s dependence on Pakistan. He further adds that “The relationship between Pakistan and Taliban is more of a coercive one than a consensual one. So there is a lot of space for India to operate as well.”  What is more, Ashley Tellis while opining on Taliban’s present foreign policy says that “The Taliban have recognized that they cannot go back to the old model of simply exporting jihad if they want their regime in Kabul to be successful. The face of moderation is the only thing that will get them what they want-at least for now.”[29]

1. “Afghanistan: Taliban takeover and way ahead,” AIDIA, published 24 December 2021, https://aidiaasia.org/research-article/afghanistan-taliban-takeover-and-way-ahead#_edn1. 2. “U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan” Congressional Research Service, published September 17, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46879. 3. AIDIA, “Afghanistan: Taliban takeover.” 4. Tanvi Pate. “Soft power, strategic narratives, and state identity: Re-assessing India-Afghanistan relations post-2011,” India Review17, no. 3 (2018): 320-351. 5. Smruti S. Pattanaik. “India’s Afghan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism,”Strategic Analysis 36, no. 4 (2012): 569. 6. Pattanaik, “India’s Afghan Policy…,”570. 7. Siddhant Kishore, “Rallying old friends: Adapting to an evolving Afghan theatre,” ORF, last updated January 7, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/rallying-old-friends-adapting-evolving-afghan-theatre/. 8. Pate, “Soft power, strategic narratives, and state identity: Re-assessing India-Afghanistan relations post-2011,” 320. 9. AIDIA, “Afghanistan: Taliban takeover.” 10. Cameron Buzatto, ed., India in Africa and Afghanistan (New York: Nova Publishers, 2013), 43. 11. Pate, “Soft power, strategic narratives, and state identity: Re-assessing India-Afghanistan relations post-2011,” 320. 12. Pant, “India’s Changing Afghan Policy...,” 45. 13. Pate, “Soft power, strategic narratives, and state identity: Re-assessing India-Afghanistan relations post-2011,” 321. 14. Pattanaik, “India’s Afghan Policy…,”570. 15. Josh Lederman, “Obama slows troops drawdown in Afghanistan,” PBS, last updated July 6, 2016, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/watch-live-obama-delivers-statement-on-troops-in-afghanistan. 16. “Q and A: Afghan Taliban open Doha office,” BBC, published June 20, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22957827. 17. Lindsay Maizland,“U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal: What to know,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated March 2, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-taliban-peace-deal-agreement-afghanistan-war. 18. Raj Verma. “The US-Taliban peace deal and India’s strategic options,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 75, no. 1 (2020): 10-14. 19. Sarral Sharma and Sameer Patil, “India’s strategy towards Post-August 2021 Afghanistan,” ORF, last updated February 28, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-strategy-towards-post-august-2021-afghanistan/. 20. “Taliban takeover of Afghanistan: India’s perspectives,” Journals of India, published August 16, 2021, https://journalsofindia.com/taliban-takeover-of-afghanistan-indias-perspectives/. 21. Kabir Taneja, “India-Pakistan rivalry heating up over Afghanistan,” ORF, last updated May 19, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pakistan-rivalry-heating-up-over-afghanistan/. 22. G.Parthsarathy, “India’s Afghan policy a tricky affair,” BusinessLine, last updated December 15, 2021, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/indias-afghan-policy-a-tricky-affair/article37963132.ece. 23. Vinay Kumar, “India’s search for a new role in Afghanistan,” MEI, last updated December 8, 2021, https://mei.edu/publications/indias-search-new-role-afghanistan. 24. Harsh V. Pant, “India is in a unique position to bridge the gap on Afghanistan,” ORF, last updated November 10, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-is-in-a-unique-position-to-bridge-the-gulf-on-afghanistan/. 25. Deutsche Welle, “Afghanistan: What taliban takeover means for the region,” The Indian Express, August 19, 2021. https://indianexpress.com/article/world/afghanistan-what-taliban-takeover-means-for-the-region-7461798/. 26. Shashi Tharoor, “India’s Taliban Problem,” Project Syndictae, last updated October 5, 2021, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-threatened-by-taliban-pakistan-china-by-shashi-tharoor-2021-10. 27. AIDIA, “Afghanistan: Taliban takeover.” 28.Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “India weighs up new security risks in wake of Taliban takeover,” The Guardian, September 13, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/13/india-weighs-up-new-security-risks-in-wake-of-taliban-takeover. 29. Petersen, “India weighs up new.” 30. Ujjwal Samrat, “Afghanistan: Situation turns chaotic as thousands gather outside Kabul airport,” Republic World, last updated August 26, 2021, https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/afghanistan-situation-turns-chaotic-as-thousands-gather-outside-kabul-airport.html. 31. Libby Cathey, “After 20 years, US ground troops leave Afghanistan, but Americans left behind,” abc News, last updated August 30, 2021. 32. “Afghanistan: Kabul encircled, the Taliban approaches the seizure of power,” archyde, published August 15, 2021, https://www.archyde.com/afghanistan-kabul-encircled-the-taliban-approach-the-seizure-of-power/. 33. Jonathan Schroden. “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,” Combating Terrorism Centre 14, Issue 1 (2021): 1.https://ctc.westpoint.edu/afghanistans-security-forces-versus-the-taliban-a-net-assessment/. 34. “As Taliban Offensive Escalates, Afghanistan at Dangerous Turning Point,” United Nations, published August 6, 2021, https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14596.doc.htm. 35. Ashfaq Maqsood Ali, India’s Afghan Policy (New Delhi: Dilpreet Publishing House, 2015), 3. 36. “India adopting ‘wait and watch’ policy on Afghanistan, says government,” The Hindu, published August 26, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/jaishankar-briefs-political-leaders-on-afghanistan-situation/article36112751.ece. 37. Rakesh Sood, “Redefining India’s role in Afghanistan,” ORF, last updated November 27, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/redefining-indias-role-in-afghanistan/. 38. Saloni Kapur, “Why India should engage the Taliban,” Deccan Herald, last updated August 27, 2021. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/why-india-should-engage-the-taliban-1024043.html. 39. Kamal Davar, “Afghanistan’s problems require a collective regional solution; India must play a leading role,” South Asia Monitor, last updated January 3, 2022. https://www.southasiamonitor.org/spotlight/afghanistans-problems-require-collective-regional-solution-india-must-play-leading-role.