1. Chinese viewpoint on Mc Mahon Line and the borderline
between China and India
China has never
recognized Mc Mohan Line as the boundary line between China and India. It
states that China didn’t sign agreement in 1913 Shimla conference between
British India, Tibet, and China.
1.1 A Chinese scholar
Zhoujin expressed his views on Mc Mahon line as follows:
On a Jurisprudence
basis, the "McMahon Line" is not at all the legal boundary line
between China and India. The current Sino-Indian boundary line is about 2,000
kilometers long. India always insisted on the so-called "McMahon
Line" as the only basis for deciding the Sino-Indian boundary line.
The McMahon Line is,
so-called “borderline” drawn by a British explorer while carrying out a
geographical survey for British colonial India. It divides the border between
India and Tibet. In the west direction, it starts from the junction of Bhutan
and Tibet and travels along the watershed and ridgeline to the tip of the
mountain in Yunnan. This line placed about 90,000 square kilometers of
territory inside India that has historically been subject to the jurisdiction, taxation,
and grazing rights enjoyed by the Tibetan authorities. At that time, the
Governor of British India was McMahon, so this measurement line was later known
as the "McMahon Line." On October 13, 1913, representatives of Tibet,
and the United Kingdom (on behalf of British India, which was not yet
independent) and the Central Government of the Republic of China held a
tripartite meeting in Shimla to discuss the status of Tibet. Tibet’s position
was to demand the recognition and guarantee of its complete independence. The
Central Government of the Republic of China insisted that Tibet is an
inalienable territory of the Republic of China, requires Tibet’s diplomatic and
national defense rights, and to a certain degree local administrative rights.
The United Kingdom reconciled with the scheme of dividing Tibet into an
external Tibet and internal Tibet and accordingly reached a tripartite
agreement. However, the Central Government of the Republic of China finally
refused to sign the agreement and refused to recognize any treaty and agreement
signed between the British and Tibetan sides, the so-called "McMahon Line
that was intended to unilaterally transfer a part of Tibet's territory to
India." Since then, the Chinese Central Government has never admitted the "McMahon
Line."
In Zhoujin’s opinion, from the legal point of
view, the explorers coming from the European island nation Britain, thousands
of miles away, have no right to demarcate a long borderline named after a
British national on behalf of the two ancient civilizations of Asia, i.e.,
China and India. Recognizing and accepting this so-called
"borderline" is not only a shameful humiliation for China, but also
shameful for the former British colony of India.
1.2 Kang Minjun in his
article states: Can the geographical principle demonstrate the validity of the
McMahon Line?
The contemporary
Indian government insisted that the geographical principle can "innately
decide" that the "McMahon Line" is an effective boundary, this
concept has undoubtedly played a very bad role in it. It not only triggered the
first armed conflict between China and India but also directly led to the 1962
Sino-Indian border war. This article tries to historically analyze the
above-mentioned concept of the contemporary Indian government and hopes to
contribute to the smooth resolution of the Sino-Indian border issue and the
restoration and development of Sino-Indian friendly relations.
Although the Indian government initially
proposed that its "published maps have borders with full authority based
on geography, traditions, and treaties," however it is not difficult to
see that the Indian government is in fact unable to argue that "Mc Mahon
Line has a sufficient treaty basis and also can’t argue that the "McMahon
Line" exists in a situation when there exists a well-known traditional and
customary line. India then only compelled to seek help from a so-called
geographical principle for its view that it insists that the "McMahon
Line" is a formal boundary.
The second part in
detail clarifies the Indian government's interpretation of the so-called
geographical principles that it adheres to the Sino-Indian border issue. The
Indian government is expounding its so-called geographical principles on the
basis of the idea that borders can be “delimited through historical processes”.
The Indian government believes that in the process of “historical delineation”,
the distinctive geographical features can “innately determine” the location and
direction of the boundary, while the most distinctive geographical features are
the watershed or ridge. The “McMahon Line” was described by the Indian
government as having a “clear geographical feature” that is considered to be
along the watershed or ridge of the eastern Himalayas. The third part fully
explains from the perspective of geographical facts that even the geographical
principle advocated by the Indian government also cannot demonstrate the
validity of the McMahon Line. The East Himalayas do not have the
characteristics of a watershed, and they cannot provide any watershed that can
precisely define the Sino-Indian boundary; and there is no unique, continuous,
and well-defined ridge in the eastern Himalayas. Therefore, it is impossible to
talk about the "McMahon Line" which is a boundary determined by distinct
geographical features such as watersheds or ridges.
On the contrary, many
observers believe that the “mountain [south] foot line is clearly the clearest
geographical feature” in the eastern Himalayas, and the “boundary along the
plain however is the natural boundary”. The traditional and customary line
advocated by China exactly goes along the foothills. It can be seen that the
geographical principles advocated by the Indian government are not necessarily
beneficial to them. The fourth part fully explains from the historical facts
that the geographical principle advocated by the Indian government not only
can’t prove the validity of the "McMahon Line", but directly lead to
the deterioration of the Sino-Indian border situation. Although the Chinese government
does not recognize the "McMahon Line", in order to resolve the border
dispute peacefully, it is actually treated as an actual control line and has
not crossed this line. The Indian government has demanded the Chinese territory
to the north of the "McMahon Line" based on the so-called
geographical principle and believes that it has the right to expel the Chinese
troops in these areas. This directly led to the first armed conflict on the
Sino-Indian border and the full-scale outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war.
1.3 Secret Talks
between Nehru-Zhou Enlai on Mc Mahon line:
Ding Yifu in his
article writes:
After the McMahon
Line, there was no dispute or conflict between Tibet and British India before
the invasion of Rong Hepeng in the early part of the last century. Tibet does
not have the "worries in the south," and the McMahon Line has played
a role in it. However, the Tibetan government has always maintained that the
Tawang region should return from India.
A lot of things
happened in Chinese politics in 1956. China’s land reform and socialist
transformation finally came to a sudden change in 1956. The Communist Party of
China transformed its country in accordance with its own ideology and reached
the most confident moment. In the Tibetan areas of the four provinces around
Tibet, "democratic reforms" triggered Tibetan resistance, and Tibetan
riots sparked. Some rebel forces were forced to move to Lhasa under the
suppression of the Chinese Communists. The divergent views of the people inside
CCP on what strategy to be adopted on the “democratic reforms” in Tibetan areas
and Tibet began to be clear (see the memoirs of General Fan Ming’s published in
Hong Kong, “The Internal Struggle in Tibet”). On one hand, the CCP was
determined to continue the "democratic reform" and "religious
reform" in the surrounding Tibetan areas. On the other hand, it still
needed to stabilize the situation in Tibet and maintain the apparent
cooperation with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government.
The young Dalai Lama
was in a very difficult situation at that time. He appealed to the central
government to maintain the stability of the Tibetan area but could not get a
response. As a Tibetan national political leader, he could not protect his
people. At this time, he had the opportunity of being invited to India to
participate in the 2500 years of Buddha's birthday. He decided to tell the
Indian Prime Minister Nehru about the problems of the Tibetan people and
prepared for refuge in India. Such an approach was capable of drawing the attention
of the international community, thus putting pressure on the Chinese government
to curb the "democratic reform" of the CCP in Tibet and Tibetan areas
so as to achieve the aim of protecting Tibetans.
According to the
memory of General Fan Ming, the Dalai Lama’s wish was that the Tibetan Workers’
Committee and the military region at that time had already mastered the
informants who infiltrated the Tibetan government. At this time, Zhou Enlai
visited many Asian countries and went through India twice during his visit and
returning home. He twice met the Dalai Lama who was in the pilgrimage site of
Buddhism twice, convinced Dalai Lama not to stay in India anyway, and promised
that "democratic reform" in Tibet has been postponed for six years,
and will be implemented only when the Tibetans themselves are willing to do so.
It can be further extended after six years. At the same time, Zhou Enlai knew
that the Dalai Lama could take refuge in India and the attitude of the host was
very crucial. Zhou Enlai encouraged Nehru to persuade Dalai Lama to return. To
this end, when talking to Nehru, Zhou Enlai took the initiative to talk on the
Sino-Indian border issue. Li Jianglin is her book "1959 Lhasa” quoted the
records of Nehru-Zhou’s secret talk, as well as an internal report of the
Indian government classified as secret. It can be said that Zhou Enlai’s
conversation made the Indian government surprised and happy:
"...McMahon Line
- I mean, we never knew, we learned about it recently. The Chinese government
at the time, that is to say, those warlords of Beijing and the Kuomintang
naturally know it. .... We have studied this issue, although we have never
admitted this line, however, the United Kingdom had a secret treaty with Tibet,
which was announced at the Shimla conference. Now, this is an established fact,
we should accept it. But so far, we have not consulted the Tibetan government.
In our last treaty on Tibet, the Tibetans demanded that we refuse to accept
this line; but we told them that this issue should be put on hold for a while.
I believe that after the independence of India, the Tibetan government
immediately wrote to the Indian government. But now we believe that we should
try to advise and persuade the Tibetans to accept this line. This issue is also
related to the China-Myanmar border and will wait until the Lama returns to
Lhasa and then to make a decision. Therefore, although this issue is not yet
decided, and it is not fair to us, we still believe that there is no better way
to accept this line."
This paragraph is
remarkable. It simply says, although the Chinese government from Yuan Shikai to
Chiang Kai-shek did not recognize the McMahon line, Zhou Enlai quite clearly
agreed to Nehru. China will now recognize the McMahon line, but just a hint of
implication: "we will make a decision after Dalai Lama returns to
Lhasa." What if the Dalai Lama did not return to Lhasa? This is equivalent
to opening a price code: You make the Dalai Lama return to Lhasa, we will
recognize the McMahon line.
In this passage, Chinese
readers who have no chance to understand the historical background of the
Shimla Conference may have several places they do not understand. Why does he
say "We have not consulted the Tibetan government", "Tibetans
have asked us to refuse to accept this line, but we told them that this issue
should be put on hold for a while." Now we believe that we should try to
advise and persuade Tibetans to accept this line. "?" If Tibet has
always been a provincial-level unit of China, then there was no need to say
such a thing.
In fact, Zhou Enlai
understands better than others that Tibet had once been an independent country.
It not only has its own independent and complete internal administrative
management system but also had the national defense, judicial, monetary,
postal, and other systems. It also has signed up a treaty on foreign trade with
neighboring countries. At the Shimla conference held in 1914, Tibet and the
British Indian governments signed an agreement on the border. Later on, the
"Indian Trade Regulations" has been signed. This regulation was
renewed every ten years and was renewed in 1924, 1934, and 1944. Sang Dong
Rinpoche, chief minister of the Tibetan government in exile, pointed out that
“all these renewals were carried out by British India and Tibet as sovereign
states.” In 1954, the Chinese government and post-independence India again
discussed the renewal of this international regulation. The agreement signed
this time has a long preamble, which was the "five principles of peaceful
coexistence" that Zhou Enlai has always been proud of. This is what Zhou
Enlai said in his speech "Our Last Treaty on Tibet." This treaty and
the "five principles" are renewals of the 1914 trade regulations.
Zhou Enlai's speech is tantamount to recognizing that the border and trade
relations that occurred as an independent country in Tibet's history are legal
and effective. It is a historical fact in line with international law.
On the issue of
territorial disputes on the Sino-Indian border, the situation and history have
pour-over, that is the Tibetan government insisting that the Tawang region be
returned from India. It is hoped that the Chinese central government will help
Tibet to do this with its status of great power. Zhou Enlai promised Nehru that
he will "convince" Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government to accept
the McMahon Line in order to meet the situation of the Chinese Communist
Party's political program for "democratic reform." (Ding Yifu)
1.4 Li Jianglin, a
Taiwanese writer who wrote in her banned book “1959 Lhasa” gives the
description of the origin of Mc Mahon line as under:
The origin of the
McMahon line
The McMahon Line
originated from the Shimla Conference participated by China, Britain, and Tibet
in 1914. Chinese publications have never been willing to tell the local people
about the ins and outs of the Shimla conference and the McMahon line because
scholars with the right to speak have to be bound by the shackles of the fact
that "Tibet has been part of China since ancient times." Hence in
their publications, they could not clarify the facts despite taking twists and
turns. The key point is that when the United Kingdom proposed a joint meeting
between China, Britain, and Tibet to determine the Tibetan border, the time was
1913. At that time, Tibet was a de facto independent country, not only
independent of internal administration but also enjoyed external independence.
If one doesn't understand this premise, he can't be clear about the Shimla
conference and also be clear about the McMahon line.
At the Shimla
conference in 1914, it was not the border issue between north India and Tibet
that took the longest time and was the most controversial issue, and ultimately
failed to reach an agreement, but the Sino-Tibetan border issue between eastern
and, northern Tibet and China. The border issue between north India and Tibet
was a matter between the representatives of British India and the
representatives of Tibet. The Chinese negotiators have no say at all in this
regard. The headache of Chen Yifan, the representative of China was that the
representative of Tibet proposed to move the eastern border of Tibet towards
the east in accordance with history and prepared and put up a large number of
pieces of evidence “from ancient times”. Chen Yifan did not dare to make
concessions, so the British representative McMahon came forward to mediate
between China and Tibet. He, as per the dividing method of Inner and Outer
Mongolia, proposed to divide Tibet into the inner and outer Tibet and proposed
the dividing line between the inner and the outer Tibet, and suggested that the
inner and outer Tibet be handled separately. McMahon wanted the Chinese
government to accept this line on the condition that he will then recognize
China’s "sovereignty" over Tibet and also recognize that "Tibet
is part of China." Conversely, if the Chinese government does not accept
it, Britain will not recognize China's "sovereignty" over Tibet. At
the same time, McMahon asked the Tibetan negotiators to accept the dividing line
between North British India and Tibet drawn by him. However, the Tawang area,
which was traditionally under the rule of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, was included
in the British Indian side.
Therefore, it is said
that, McMahon drew a complete boundary line for Tibet at the Shimla conference.
The British people thought that Tibet after establishing the border with
British India will become a safe buffer zone in the north of British India.
Finally, the Chinese government refused to sign because it did not accept the
division of Tibet into inner and outer Tibet, and it still had an opportunity
to "reconcile in the future" in the relationship between Tibet and
China. The British and Tibetan representatives signed an agreement on the
India-Tibet border, which was later called the border of the McMahon Line.
The Shimla conference
was commented on by many members of the British government and Western academic
circles as a failed conference. India was the beneficiary of the conference
because it had a northern borderline signed at an international conference,
including the Tawang region that was signed and given to it. Since the Tibetan
negotiators lost the Tawang area and were reprimanded and dismissed by the 13th
Dalai Lama after the conference. In the future, the Tibetan government will propose
to bring the Tawang area back, if it gets the opportunity.
At the Shimla
conference, the pattern of tripartite parties was that the representatives of
Britain and Tibet were friendly and jointly dealt with the Chinese
representatives. For the Tibetan government, it no longer felt that British
India is a threat. Instead, it felt that China is a threat that makes them
worry. The formation of this pattern originated from the imperial court sending
troops to Tibet in the late Qing Dynasty, and made a fuss in Lhasa, forcing the
thirteenth Dalai Lama to seek exile in India. Unfortunately, the Chinese
government has never reflected on the mistakes and lessons China has made in
this historical period. After the Shimla conference, China and Tibet had several
border wars and ceasefire agreements in the 1920s and 1930s. Tibet has always
regarded itself as a completely independent country. The Chinese government
once had no "diplomatic personnel" in Lhasa. After the death of the
13th Dalai Lama, the Chinese government took the opportunity to send a sling
group headed by Huang Musong, then only re-established official contact with
Lhasa. It is said that during the condolences, Huang Musong awarded a
"Medal of Honor" to the top officials of the Tibetan government in
Tibet. The Tibetans after knowing that this is another old trick. They can
later claim that this was the central government's recognition of local
officials. The government of the Gaxag then awarded the title of
"Zosa" to all officials of Huang Musong and his party and attached a
full set of official uniforms. Tit for tat, and hence no one mentions it.
To put it simply, the
McMahon Line is the product of the Shimla Conference, and the historical
background of this meeting and this line cannot ruin the fact that Tibet was an
independent country at that time. Without explaining this fact, it is natural
that the Shimla conference can’t be explained clearly, and also can’t clarify
the McMahon line.
1.5 The traditional
customary boundary line
Chen Tiqiang in his
article titled “中印边界问题的法律方面” says:
India claims that the border it claims is
"with full authority based on geography, tradition, and treaty". From the above text, we can see that India’s
so-called treaty basis does not exist. In the absence of a treaty, it is not
impossible to define boundaries by tradition and customs. However, since there
exist two kinds of scholarships for the traditional and customary line between
China and India, it is necessary for both parties to produce evidence piece by
piece to prove which one is more reasonable and the evidence is more
sufficient. This is the method advocated by China. But India does not want to
do this but wants to use a simple way to impose all its claims in one fell
swoop on China. The weapon it uses is the so-called “geographical principle of
the watershed”. The boundary line it claims consistently conforms to the
watershed principle and is, therefore, the only correct one.
1.6 Which are the
disputed areas on the Sino-Indian border?
Dong Yujie in his
above-titled article states:
China and India border
nearly 2,000 kilometers. Divided into the west, middle and east sections, there
are disputed areas in each section.
1.6.1 Eastern Section:
Mc Mahon line, the pain of Southern Tibet.
Southern Tibet area is
the largest disputed area between China and India, the capital is Tawang, which
was an important administrative center of Southern Tibet in history. As early
as in the 7th century, it belonged to the territory of the local government of Tibet,
China. In the 13th century, the Yuan Dynasty governed this area. In the
mid-17th century, the fifth Dalai Lama unified Tibet and implemented various
forms of effective management. After the middle of the 19th century, Qing
Dynasty Minister in Tibet and the Tibetan Local Government specially awarded
real power of the Cuona zong and Tawang monestry to manage this region, and was
responsible for the formulation of laws and systems and dealing with major
administrative, religious, and border affairs. Every year, the local government
of Tibet used to send a special person to this place for the purpose of
collecting and purchasing rice, especially managed economic and trade
activities in this area like management of salt, rice, etc.
In 1911, the Chinese
Xinhai Revolution broke out. The 13th Dalai Lama convened a local
representative meeting in Tibet and sought the opinion on the policy that Tibet
should adopt hereafter. As a result, many people especially the lower class of
the masses do not agree with severing ties between the Tibetan local and the
central government. But at this time, India’s ruling power, the United Kingdom,
however vigorously pushed for Tibet’s independence. And planned to hold a
tripartite conference participated by China, Britain, and Tibet. And this was
the so-called Shimla conference. At this conference, due to the Tibet and
Chinese government’s opposition, the plot of the British instigating Tibet’s
independence was not successful. But the British colonizer still did not
reconcile, its representative McMahon and consultant Berr deceived and
persecuted Tibet’s representative Lonchen Shatra to carry out a private deal,
and drew a line on the Map dividing the borders between India and Tibet, thus
creating a so-called McMahon line and incorporated more than 90,000 square
kilometers of land in southern Tibet back to British India which had always
belonged to the jurisdiction of Chinese Tibet. UK didn’t dare to disclose this
dirty transaction for many years, after several decades quietly stuffed into
the map published in the UK, And Lonchen Shatra did not dare to formally go to
XVIIIth Dalai Lama to report on it, there was no approval from Tibet for this
illegal territory deal. Successive Chinese governments have never acknowledged
this so-called boundary line.
Despite this, this
McMahon line become an indelible humiliating feature in modern Chinese
history. After the peaceful liberation
of Tibet in 1950, the Indian government re-raised the issue of the McMahon line
and further advanced to the north of the line. Starting from the overall
situation, China has maintained restraint on India’s invasion of southern Tibet
areas and hoped to resolve the boundary issue through negotiation, but it was
opposed by India and eventually led to the 1962 war. Until now, the vast
majority of Southern Tibet was still under the control of India, the knife cut
made by British colonists on Chinese territory, still makes China faintly
painful.
1.6.2 Western Section:
Aksai Chin – mistake of the Johnson line
The disputed area in
the western section of China and India is mainly in Aksai Chin. It is located
in the southern part of Hetian, Xinjiang, between the Kunlun Mountains and the
Karakorum Mountains. It is a semi-enclosed mountain basin. Aksai Chin, in
Turkic means "Chinese Baishitan” (White rocky beach).
In the Qing Dynasty,
there was the establishment of the Extension Bureau in Aksai Chin. After the
British annexation of Jammu-Kashmir in 1846, it claimed that Ladakh (originally
an area under the jurisdiction of the local government of Tibet, was a part of
Kashmir) should return to the British Indian Government for the rule. Not
waiting for the consent of the Qing government, the British occupied the Ladakh
region. Later, in the marking of the border between Ladakh and Tibet, the
British invaders, in order to look for a shortcut for aggression to the
hinterland of Xinjiang, in 1865, sent Indian Bureau of Survey official Johnson
to sneak into southern Xinjiang Area, from Ladakh entered into the Aksai Chin
and finally arrived in Hetian, Xinjiang. He, through "surveying",
drew a borderline, this was called the Johnson line. This line has given nearly
30,000 square kilometers of land including Aksai Chin to British India, making
Aksai Chin part of the British-Indian Kashmir, but the British government has
never informed the Qing government of that time. India on the basis of the
Johnson line put forward territorial claims in Aksai Chin, in the late 1950s,
the border dispute between China and India hence started.
1.6.3 Middle section:
Why to return Shenshan Holy Lake?
The middle section of
the Sino-Indian border starts from a place of intersection of borderline of
three countries i.e., China, Nepal and India. It starts from Dingshu Mountain
Pass, Qiangla Pu'an County in the Ali area of Tibet, and extends 545 kilometers
in the northwest direction, with a disputed area of more than 2,000 Square
kilometers.
This area has a
beautiful " Kailash Mansarovar Lake". "Shenshan- sacred
mountain" refers to China’s Gang Rinpoche, the main peak of the Gangdese
Mountains, in the Tibetan language it means "the mountain of the
gods." Shiquan River, Maquan River, Xiangquan River, and Peacock River are
present around it. It is the origin of the Indus River, Yarlung Zangbo river
(Brahmaputra) , Satluz River and the Ganges. Gang Rinpoche is recognized in the
world as God Mountain, at the same time recognized as the center of the world
in Hinduism, Tibetan Buddhism, and Tibetan native religion Bon and ancient Jain
religion, "Sacred Lake" refers to the Lake Manasarovar in the south
of the God Mountain. It is a plateau’s Freshwater Lake of area 412 square
kilometers and is 4587 meters above sea level. It is recorded in Tibetan
historical records. Lake Manasarovar is the "Yao Chi" Living place of
the Western Queen in the Han myths and legends, Indian Buddhists call it
"Sacred Lake."
The ruins of the
ancient Guge dynasty are also there in this region. In the middle of the 9th
century, Tibetan Wang Lang Darma implemented the policy of destroying the
Buddha and caused a series of turmoil in the royal family, the Tubo dynasty
finally collapsed. The descendants of the royal family who maintained Buddhism
fled to the Ali area to escape the disaster and established Guge Dynasty. 16
kings were inherited before and after the dynasty. In the middle of the 17th
century, the Guge Dynasty occurred a Civil war, the dynasty was overthrown.
After Guge’s fall, it entered into Ladakh (present-day Kashmir) for a while,
and was regained by Tibet’s local government headed by the Dalai Lama. Guge has
important position in the history of Tibet’s economic and cultural development.
Many important Buddhist teachings of ancient India, passed on to the hinterland
of Tibet from here. It was also one of the important foreign trade business
centre of ancient Tibet.
(From World Knowledge,
2009) Issue 17 Dong Yujie / Wen)
2. Reasons for the
Sino-Indian war 1962:
2.1 Chinese scholars
compiled a book titled “History of Counterattack in Self-defense in China-India
border areas 中印边境自卫反击作战史”. In the Foreword of this book, they write:
“The outbreak of the
Sino-Indian border war was not by chance but had a complex historical
background with realistic reasons. After the establishment of the Peoples’
Republic of China, the Indian Government left no stone unturned to interfere in
the Chinese Government’s peaceful liberation of Tibet. India attempted to
maintain the special rights in Tibet; protected the feudal agriculture slave
system in Tibet; supported rebellion by the upper class and helped Tibet become
a buffer zone between China and India. India openly put forth comprehensive
territorial claims to the Chinese Government. Moreover, India sent forces to
cross the traditional and customary line, and they illegally captured 90,000
sq. Km of Chinese Territory in the south of Mc Mahon Line. Sino-Indian Border conflict was the
continuation and the development of the Sino-Indian border dispute and border
struggle. It was the outcome of the factors like: “Indian Government inherited
the mantle of British imperialistic aggression, pursued the policy of
expansionism and regional hegemony; deliberately created the tense situation on
the borders and nibbled up and encroached on Chinese territory.
India received support
from the United States, Soviet Union, and International reactionary forces; it
was a strong noise in the international anti-China chorus. In order to safeguard the unity of
motherland, to avoid violation of its territorial interiority, to protect the
results of the socialist revolution and construction work in Tibet and
Xinjiang, and to create the conditions for solving the Sino Indian border
issues through peaceful negotiation, the Chinese Frontier Guards, were
compelled to carry out Counterattack in self-defense in a situation reaching
the end of forbearance and left with no room to go back. This action received the adulation and
support of Chinese people and people of the entire world. (Counterattack in
Self-defense)”
2.2 A Chinese scholar
Xiaoxiao writes:
India wanted to nibble
up Chinese territory
“The Sino-Indian
border is about 1710 kilometers long and is divided into three sections:
Eastern, Middle and Western sectors. Traditionally, China and India have formed
a traditional customary boundary line based on historical administrative jurisdiction.
In the early 19th century, the British Indian authorities used India as the
base to target the south-western and north-western frontier regions of China
for aggression and expansion. After India’s independence, it “inherited” the
ambitions of the British colonists and intensified its new encroachment on
Chinese territory.
In 1961, Indian
Defense Minister Menon issued the "Ankar" action plan, ordering the
Indian army to accelerate its advancement towards the north along the
"McMahon Line", seize as much Chinese land as possible, and build as
many posts as possible.”
2.3 An article
published on ifeng website says:
India hits at the door
of the Chinese Nation
China and India have
been adjacent to each other since ancient times, and the customary borderline
is the southern foothills of the Himalayas. There is basically no dispute.
However, since the British occupation of India, the British Indian governments
tried to separate Tibet from Chinese territory; leaving hidden dangers for the
later Sino-Indian dispute. In 1914, the British government representative Henry
McMahon and the Tibetan local representative made a secret exchange of letters
in New Delhi, India, to form the "China-India borderline", known as
the famous "McMahon Line."
In October 1949, after
the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party, the diplomatic strategy of
the "one-sided" socialist camp was implemented. Therefore, the
Sino-Indian border issue was temporarily put aside amidst the slogan of
"Uniting all Asian, African, and Latin American countries." However,
Indian Prime Minister Nehru did not accept this diplomatic strategy from China
and indulged in the strategic concept of the "Greater Indian
Federation."
After 1959, India
continued to carry out armed provocation on the Chinese border. By 1961, the
Chinese government had repeatedly proposed peace talks to Nehru and implemented
the segregation policy, which was rejected one by one. In 1962, the situation
became tenser. In June, the Indian army accelerated the armed invasion of
China. The eastern section has crossed the “McMahon Line” and entered the
Chedong area of Tibet’s southern mountains. As of the end of August, the Indian
Army has established more than 100 strongholds in China. These strongholds were
minimum tens of meters to maximum a few hundred meters away from the Chinese
post, forming a "face-to-face" confrontation; some wedged between
Chinese posts, and some inserted behind the Chinese border post. Nehru even
asked to drive out the Chinese from the border area. This also made China give
up "patience" and prepare for military confrontation on the grounds
of "self-defense in counterattack."
3. Chinese perspective
on different aspects of war
3.1 1962 Counterattack in Self-defense in
Sino-Indian border areas: a political war
“China views 1962 Counterattack in
Self-defense in Sino-Indian border areas as a political war fought to seek
political advantages or to achieve political goals. Wang Xuejun in his article
says:
“Looking at the 1962
Counterattack in Self-defense in Sino-Indian border areas, on the surface, it
was a military confrontation caused by border conflicts, however, in essence,
it was a complicated political contest based on the border conflicts. As early
as, May 1962, Zhou Enlai pointed out: "The political significance of the
Sino-Indian border struggle is greater than the military significance”. Mao
Zedong acclaimed this war as "fought a military-political war, or can be
called as political-military war." As per a comprehensive analysis, the
1962 Counterattack in Self-defense in Sino-Indian border areas was essentially
a political war.”
“Although 1962
Counterattack Operation in Self-defense in Sino-Indian border areas started due
to border issues, its outbreak was not accidental, moreover have even deeper
reasons and that is the political game between the big powers in the Cold War
era. In a comprehensive analysis, the 1962 Counterattack in Self-defense in
Sino-Indian border areas was essentially a political war.
First, the root cause
of the eruption of the 1962 Counterattack in Self-defense in Sino-Indian border
areas was "the political game between the big powers during the Cold War
era and this was the main manifestation of its ‘political war’ nature. Second,
the main aim of the Counterattack in Self-defense in Sino-Indian border areas
was to seek a politically favorable situation, which was the outstanding
manifestation of its “Political war” sort of characteristic. Third, all the
military operations under the Counterattacks in Self-defense in the Sino-Indian
border areas were planned and implemented according to the needs of the
political struggle. This was a distinct manifestation of its ‘Political
nature’.”
3.2 An Analysis of the Crisis Management of the
Chinese Government in the Sino-Indian Border Dispute
Huang Xiangping and Qi Pengfei in
their paper write:
3.2.1 The
characteristics of the Sino-Indian border crisis
The entire Cold War
period that started after the end of the Second World War was an era in which
international crises occurred frequently, and New China was born in such an
era. Therefore, at the beginning of the founding of New China, it had to deal
with a series of crises that were related to its own safety and interests, such
as the Korean War crisis and the Taiwan Strait crisis, etc. The Sino-Indian
border conflict was an international crisis that had an important impact on
Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Soviet relations, and even on international
relations in South Asia. The CCP leaders, in the course of dealing with this
border crisis, reflected some of its unique principles and ways of thinking
adopted in decision-making during the crisis.
3.2.1.1 Crisis
management thinking led by Ideology. In the whole process of dealing with the
Sino-Indian border crisis, Mao Zedong and other first-generation central
leadership always proceeded from the principle of ideology and determined the
specific guiding principles and policies of the Chinese government based on the
method of class analysis. This was a distinctive feature in the handling of
border crises between China and India.
When China-India
relations were friendly in the 1950s, the guiding ideology of China's
development of relations with India was Mao Zedong's "Middle region"
theory. Mao Zedong has classified India into the third type of country, i.e.,
"the oppressed nationalities and countries. These were not led by the
Communist Party, but led by patriotic groups and political parties (the state)."
(p.176) Even when the Sino-Indian relationship changed due to the Tibet issue,
Mao Zedong still stressed: "Who is Nehru? He is the middle sect of the
Indian bourgeoisie class and is different from the rightists." After the
Sino-Indian border dispute was publicized, the anti-China foreign policy of the
Nehru government and the anti-China current in India caused Mao Zedong to
rethink the "Middle Region" theory and directly affected the policy
toward India. India stubbornly rejected the Chinese government's proposal to
resolve the border issue through peaceful negotiations and adopted a
"Forward policy" to create a Sino-Indian border crisis, convincing
Chinese leaders that India is becoming a reactionary nationalism, and Nehru has
become the agent of India’s big bourgeoisie class. They believe that "the
Indian ruling group headed by Nehru provoked the Sino-Indian border incident,
just as they interfered in China's Tibet, it is also not an accidental
phenomenon, but decided by the Indian big bourgeoisie landlord closely
integrated with the interests of imperialism. The decision-making of this
expansionist reaction of the Indian big bourgeois-landlord is an important part
of Nehru's philosophy." "If we
give a concession to Nehru, not only he will become more reactionary ... and
will also make him more powerful, we can’t take this approach." It was 中间地带”理论 under the guidance of
the above ideas that the Chinese government adopted a policy of resolutely
fighting the Indian expansionists and finally initiated the decision to launch
the self-defense counterattack.
3.2.1.2 Crisis
management strategy taking the overall situation into consideration. When the Chinese
government was dealing with the Sino-Indian border crisis, it didn’t treat it
merely as a crisis in Sino-Indian relations triggered by the border issue, but
combined it with the Chinese strategic overall situation including diplomacy
and international struggle and hence determined its own guiding principles and
the policy.
In the long period
after the Sino-Indian border crisis erupted, China has adopted restraint and
patience to India’s "Forward Policy" of step-by-step advance, tried
its best to avoid armed conflicts between the two sides. Zhou Enlai, in a letter sent to the leaders
of Asian and African countries after the self-defense counterattack against the
Indian forces, said, "In order to prevent this unfortunate situation
(war), the Chinese government has been making every possible effort for three
years."[8 ] (p.150) This practice of China did not scare India. According
to recollections of Lei Yingfu, then deputy director of the General Staff
Operations Department, Mao Zedong talked about the efforts to resolve the
border issue peacefully with India in several internal speeches around 1962.
First, China is a socialist country and advocates peace against war. Second,
China is still very backward. It needs a peaceful and stable international
environment for socialist construction. Third, China’s main war threat comes
from the United States. Therefore, it is necessary to have good relations with
India and ensure the stability of the southwestern border. [15] (p.204). These
points undoubtedly indicate that Chinese leaders were taking a strategic
overall situation into consideration while dealing with the Sino-Indian border
crisis.
Mao Zedong later
changed the "Policy of restraint" and decided to launch a
counter-attack against India. On one hand, India ‘got an inch, wanted a foot’
and broke the bottom line of China's patience. On the other hand, the development
of this crisis has already affected the overall situation of China's diplomatic
international strategy. At this time, the Soviet and Chinese communist parties
had fundamental differences on a number of major theoretical issues. The Soviet
Union criticized China for adopting a wrong struggle policy against the
nationalist country India and publicly favored India on the Sino-Indian border
dispute. The CCP believed that this was a manifestation of the Soviet leaders’
implementation of the revisionist line. The Western countries headed by the
United States have provided a lot of assistance to India and helped India to
fight against China. From the viewpoint of Chinese leaders, India has now
become the vanguard of imperialism and revisionism against China. Only by
resolutely fighting back the aggression, China then only can fight against the
arrogance of imperialism and defend the theoretical principles of Marxism.
Based on this strategic consideration, the Chinese government chose to launch a
self-defense counterattack against India.
3.2.1.3 A highly
centralized decision-making system in the crisis. The occurrence of
international crises often exceeds the expectations of policymakers, in the
case of risks and rapid changes, whether a country's decision-making level is
decisive and powerful, whether the decision-making mechanism is concentrated
and efficient, it all has a crucial impact on the success or failure of crisis
management. Because the crisis situation requires decision-makers to accurately
judge the situation and make decisions quickly; on the other hand, it can be
capable of centrally mobilizing domestic resources and putting the decisions
into practice.
After the Sino-Indian
border crisis, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the top leaders of the CPC Central
Committee, have always paid close attention to the development of the crisis.
In order to timely study and deal with the situation on the Sino-Indian border,
the Central Military Commission has specially set up a working team composed of
Wang Shangrong, the head of General Staff operation department, Deputy Minister
of the General Armed Forces, Deputy Head Lei Yingfu, and Director of the Border
Defense Department, Cheng Xueyu, and they were jointly responsible for the
intelligence work against India. They often attended the decision-making
meeting of the central high-level or reported directly to Mao Zedong and Zhou
Enlai. In this way, the leaders of the Chinese government could obtain the
first-line situation of crisis development at any time, and make timely
decisions to respond to them, thereby greatly reducing the decision-making
level and improving the efficiency of decision-making. After the CCP central
committee made the decision, usually under the direction of the Political
Bureau of the Central Committee and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai convened a joint
meeting of responsible persons in defense and foreign affairs ministry to
discuss the implementation. When the joint meeting needed to take measures in
an important situation, they may report to Mao Zedong on the telephone, or send
the drafted materials to Mao Zedong and the Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau of the Central Committee review and approve it, after that Zhou Enlai,
on the spot, use to send it to the relevant departments for implementation.
This was a highly centralized and unified command organization. The handling
plan for the Sino-Indian border crisis was thus introduced and put into
practice. 5 Every major deployment of struggle against India, including photos,
letters, news, and negotiations, was approved by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai
personally. [19] In this way, the Chinese government can quickly respond to the
crisis situation and can mobilize and coordinate various resources in a short
period of time and implement the decision-making, thus ensuring success in
crisis management.
3.2.1.4 Crisis
management methods for mandatory active intervention. The so-called
mandatory active intervention refers to a situation when the trend develops in
the direction of being out-of-control after the outbreak of the crisis,
reversing the direction of the crisis by taking the initiative to launch an
attack and adopting a fierce means and even a war so as to prevent further
deterioration of the situation and prevent the escalation of the crisis. At the
critical moment of the Sino-Indian border crisis, Chinese policymakers faced
the intricate situation at home and abroad, and weighed the pros and cons to
make a decision to launch a self-defense counterattack against India. It
possessed the typical nature of the mandatory active intervention.
It should be said that
in the circumstances prevailing at that time, the Sino-Indian border conflict
was inevitable. On the one hand, the attitudes of the two governments on the
border issue were fundamentally opposed. The Chinese government advocated
maintaining the status quo of the border, negotiating the situation, and
finally solving the problem. The Indian government however adopted a
"Forward Policy" to change the status quo of the border. All
negotiations were rejected before the borderline reaches a state that was
considered satisfactory. On the other hand, in the face of the “Forward Policy”
of the Indian government, the Chinese government couldn’t make unlimited
concessions. In the minds of Chinese leaders, there was no doubt that there
existed a policy bottom line, and the continuous advancement of the Indian army
on the front line can sooner or later breakthrough this bottom line. Thus,
after all, possible efforts to resolve the border issue peacefully, the Chinese
government was bound to be involved in armed conflict with India. By October
1962, border conflicts had emerged at a glance. On October 2, Nehru publicly
claimed that India will use military power to deal with China. At this time,
the Indian army has already assembled more than 20,000 troops in the east and
west sections of the border. On October 14, Indian Defense Minister Menon vowed
to fight with China till having the last man, the last gun, and he flew to
Dispur in the border reason to carry out operational mobilization. [12] (p.281)
Under such
circumstances, the Chinese army either to continue stalemate with India on the
borderline, wait for the large-scale attack of the Indian army; or actively
take initiative to launch an attack and to deter India’s adventurous actions
using a limited self-defense counterattack and prevent the outbreak of even
large scale crisis. For the Chinese government, the highest goal of dealing
with this crisis was to maintain the long-term peace and tranquility in the
southwestern border, because "China's main focus and struggle were in the
East, in the Western Pacific area, in the fierce US Imperialism, not in India,
none of the countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia."
And if China waits for
the Indian army to attack, it will obviously be impossible to predict the time,
scale, and extent of its involvement in the war, and of course, it cannot
ensure the realization of its strategic objectives. The first generation of
central leadership groups such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, after careful
thinking, finally made a decision to conduct a self-defense counterattack and
stipulated that the purpose of the war was to punish the Indian aggressors and
to bring the Indian government to the negotiating table instead of using force
to realize its own territorial claims. This was a very decisive step for the
Chinese government while dealing with this border crisis. It enabled China to
grasp the initiative of crisis management. This war was completely carried out
under the control of the Chinese government, thus effectively avoiding the
expansion of the war and the escalation of the crisis, and fundamentally
reversing the direction of crisis development.
3.3 The Conjecture of Mao Zedong Thought
on the Sino-Indian War
"Dalai wants to
run the best, can't ask for it! We can quickly smash and let go of reform. We
can dissolve the Dalai Lama's Tibetan government and set up the military
management committee."
Therefore, Mao Zedong
personally watched the battle report, looked at the map, and directly wrote the
order. Commanding the powerful People's Liberation Army, leaving only way for
Dalai Lama to go to India. In the battle report, Dalai’s path was the same as
his expectations. Mao Zedong was very happy, thinking that this is the modern
Zhuge Liang’s release.
"Dalai and his
tens of thousands of people have come to India to see how he lives? I expect
him to be willing to come back in the future."
Nehru gave Dalai a
place to live and gave them living expenses. Mao Zedong was not happy. He said
to himself,
"Nehru is not a
good thing. Since 1950, he has occupied the southern area of the Mc Mahon line,
taking advantage of the opportunity that we were not taking care of it. Zhou
Enlai always said that peace is important, construction is important, should
improve the lives of ordinary people. Say the five principles of peaceful
coexistence he concluded with Nehru are how good. This is entirely the heart of
women! What is important is to defeat imperialism and liberate all mankind.
That is a great cause. We, China must take up responsibility, have to take up
this responsibility and the responsibility of leading the world revolution is
on our shoulders. Fortunately, the Chinese people are used to it. What if they
further suffer for the next ten years and 20 years? Chinese people are
numerous, it doesn’t matter if half of them are dying. Mao Zedong had said to
his comrades, "As far as Nehru is concerned, we can't be soft, we must be
tough, and we must fight and reach up to the head of Nehru."
The historical fact is
that in 1952, Zhou En said that China and India had no border problems. In
1954, when China and India entered into the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, Nehru gave Zhou Enlai a map of the border. Zhou Enlai accepted it
without any objection. Nehru’s policy toward Tibet was to build a strong
partnership with China and negotiate and compromise with each other. Nehru was
confident that India and China will become the axis countries of Asia. At that
time, Zhou Enlai was very sweet in dealing with Nehru. Myanmar Prime Minister
Ba Swe had warned Nehru to be careful about Zhou Enlai.
Before 1959, China
never protested to India on the border issue. After the Dalai Lama fled,
China’s protests continued. In the National People’s Congress, Zhou Enlai
spoke, Chen Yi spoke and Zhu De spoke to put pressure on Nehru. Protesting and
putting pressure has no effect, and India still supplies Dalai on a monthly
basis.
On October 2, 1959,
Khrushchev spoke to Mao Zedong and said good things on behalf of Nehru. Mao
Zedong thought, okay! The United States, USSR, and India are going to unite to
deal with us.
In the Indian
parliament, the protests against China made a tough response. Mao Zedong
thought that our NPC is a rubber stamp, and the Indian Congress is not a rubber
stamp. Nehru will be afraid of Congress. I see that the tough stand of the
Parliament is directed by Nehru, but in fact, he himself is going to be tough
on us!
The historical fact is
that:
In 1960, Zhou Enlai
expressed the hope that India would abandon its jurisdiction over Aksai Chin in
exchange for NEFA (North-East Frontier Area) to India. Nehru asked China to
abandon Aksai Chin, a plateau desert that connects the two states of India.
In 1961, India sent
troops to recover Goa, a small land that was occupied by Portugal and it
refused to return to India. Khrushchev used this matter to satirize Mao Zedong.
You keep saying that you are against imperialism. India dares to take back Goa.
Do you dare to take back Hong Kong?
Mao Zedong thought
this proves that India is an expansionist country. Chen Yi is right. Nehru’s
Forward policy is to put a knife on us, and we can’t wait dying closing our
eyes! (With this statement, it can be seen that Chen Yi’s diplomatic views are
ignorant and pleasing. In fact, India is nibbling away the border territory. Chinese
farmers can suffer and can also emigrate there.)
Mao Zedong said,
"The armed confrontation and armed coexistence are not acceptable on the
border." "Fight a war, and there will be peace for thirty
years."
At the Politburo
meeting, Mao Zedong said that the Indian army is patrolling on the Mc Mahon
line, and our People's Liberation Army turned a blind eye there. What are they
doing there? Where to defend the motherland? All reactionaries are paper
tigers, and India is also a paper tiger. We fight with them, they can’t fight.
They will flee in turbulence, Nehru came to the door to accompany and promised
no longer support Dalai. The Dalai Lama can't afford to feed tens of thousands
of people in India. If he can't get along, he will come to ask for mercy. We
can also give him personal paying committee chairmen but only live in Beijing.
3.4 Peace proposal
The Chinese border
defense forces have achieved great victories in the first phase of self-defense
counterattacks, and the military struggle was in a very favorable situation.
However, in line with the consistent position of peaceful settlement of border
disputes, the Chinese government, in order to alleviate the serious situation
caused by the Indian authorities, and for the fundamental interests of the Chinese
and Indian peoples, issued a statement on October 24, 1962, proposed three
suggestions for the peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue. The
main three points are that the armed forces of the two sides have to withdraw
20 kilometers from the actual control line and disengage. Premier Zhou Enlai
sent a letter to Prime Minister Nehru, hoping that the Indian government will
respond positively to the three proposals of the Chinese government. The three
proposals have made the people of the world more aware of China’s sincerity in
the peaceful settlement of the border issue. In accordance with the government
statement, the Chinese border guards stopped the pursuit of pursuing an attack
in the eastern section on October 24 and assembled in the north of the Tawang
River. The western section stopped the counterattack against the invading
Indian forces on October 28 and assembled in the Jiagang and Ritozon areas to
take a rest. On November 4th, Zhou Enlai sent a letter to Nehru again, calling
on India to respond positively to the three suggestions of the Chinese
government, pointing out that China’s three proposals are equal and not
one-sided as for as both parties are concerned, and are equal rather than
yielding, are based on Mutual accommodation rather than imposing on others.
They are mutually respectful rather than bullying one side. They are based on
friendly consultation and not arbitrariness. The Chinese government's three
proposals and actions to stop counterattacks have been warmly welcomed and praised
by peace-loving countries and people in the world, mobilized international
public opinion, supported China's peaceful foreign policy, and urged the Indian
government to respond to China's proposals. The three proposals not only once
again demonstrated China’s sincerity in peace, but also stripped Nehru’s
self-proclaimed peace-neutrality, non-aligned cloak, exposed the true face of
the Indian authorities’ aggression, and further exposed the slander of
reactionary forces of India and the world against China.
Although the Indian
government suffered a fiasco in the first phase of the war, it still refused to
admit defeat. It categorically rejected the three proposals of the Chinese
government and blatantly demanded that the border state before September 28,
1962, be restored, i.e. to restore the status in which the Indian army occupied
China's large territory after the invasion and attacked that the peace proposal
of China is "a scam." The Indian government has further set off an
anti-China wave and stepped up its war mobilization and preparation. Announced
that the country is in a "state of emergency", set up a cabinet
" to respond to the emergency", publicly appealed to the United
States and other Western countries for military assistance, dispatched troops
from all over the country, dispatched troops to the border day and night, and
rushed to transport weapons, united to have a military confrontation with China
once again and decided to fight with our army. By mid-November, the Indian army
had added two divisions, nine brigades, one artillery, and one armored unit in
the east and west sections of the Sino-Indian border. The total strength
increased to more than 30,000. The layout was: in the eastern section, four
brigades in the fourth division were deployed along the Xishankou (western
pass)-Bomdila road; the eleventh brigade was deployed in the Wanong area; the
fifth brigade was distributed in both sides of
“Subanxili” and Xi'an, the 192nd Brigade was located in Tezpur. In the
western section, the 70th Brigade was deployed in the East Bank and its west
area; The fourth brigade was deployed in Chuwule and its north; the third
division of the Himalayas was located in Leh. Nehru thought that this would be
sure to defeat our army. Under the big blow of the Indian government, the
Indian army of Waalong and Xikoushan launched a fierce attack on our army on
November 14 and 16. In view of this, to ease the tension on the border and
create conditions for resolving the border issue through negotiations, we still
must have to give Indian army a heavy blow. Therefore, the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission decided to
counterattack the invasion of the Indian army.
3.5 Counterattack against India
(November 16 to 21, 1962)
In the face of the
invasion of the Indian army once again, the Central Military Commission
immediately ordered the Tibetan and Xinjiang border guards to continue to
counter the invasion of the Indian army in the eastern and western sections. In
the eastern section, the former Tibet Military Command commanded the forces of
8 infantry regiments and 3 artillery regiments, launched counterattack western
pass in south of Tawang river and Bomdila area. In order to strengthen the
command of the eastern part of eastern section, it was decided to form the
Chanmdo area sub front command (namely Ningzhi). It was composed of Army
commander Ding Sheng, deputy army commander Wei Tongtai, the military deputy
political commissar Zhong Chi, the political department director Lan Yinong,
and the Changdu military sub-district commander Hong Jinwu, who commanded the
strength of the four regiments. The Walong area countered the Tibetan Shannan
and Linzhi district troops and counterattacked in the central part of the
eastern section to cooperate with the main direction. In the western section,
the former Xinjiang Military Region commanded the main force of a regiment and
counterattacked in the Bangongluo area.
3.6 End of the war
At 2400 hours on
November 21, 1962, the General Staff sent to the various units with a special
telegram. The message was as follows: the former military command of the Tibet
Military Region, the military region, the Dingzhi, Kangzhi, the Xinjiang
Military Region and Chengdu, Lanzhou, and the Beijing Military Region: In order
to further strive for the political initiative, the center decided that the
Chinese government issued a statement announcing to promote the peaceful
settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue. Our army decided to take the
initiative to cease fire from 0:00 on November 22, and on December 1st, will
take the initiative to withdraw up to 20 kilometers inside the actual control
line on November 7, 1959.
00:00 on November 22,
1962. In accordance with Mao Zedong’s orders, the Chinese military ceased fire
on the entire Sino-Indian border.
On December 1, 1962,
the Chinese army took the initiative to withdraw. By March 1, 1963, all of them
were retracted to within 20 kilometers of the actual control line on November
7, 1959. This was the Chinese government's desire to maintain friendly
relations between China and India. It once again uses practical actions to
express China's sincerity in pursuing the Sino-Indian border issue through
peaceful negotiations rather than through force.
The Chinese border guards
were ordered to wipe and repair a large number of weapons and vehicles seized
in the counterattack, and the other military materials seized were packed and
returned to India in mid-December. For the captured personnel, the policy was
not to kill, not to fight, not to insult, and not to confiscate private
belongings. Give preferential treatment to life and treat the injured.
This move by the
Chinese government has no precedent in the history of war and has been highly
praised by many countries and people in the world. ( Sino-Indian war )
3.6 Statement of the
government of the People's Republic of China
October 24, 1962
Recently, serious
armed conflicts have taken place on the Sino-Indian border. The occurrence of
this situation is very unfortunate. The Chinese and Indian peoples have always
been friendly, and they should continue to be friendly for generations to come.
China and India have been confronted by the border issue. This is something the
Chinese government and people do not want to see, and it is also unwilling to
see the peace-loving countries and people around the world.
The Sino-Indian border
issue is a problem left over from history. There are traditional customary
boundaries between the two countries, and the borders between the two countries
have never been formally demarcated. The so-called McMahon Line in the eastern
section is a state in which the British imperialists used the Chinese and
Indian people's powerless status in the past. It is illegal to attempt to
impose it on China. The Chinese government never recognizes it. The Indian side
has been special after India’s independence. Before and after the peaceful
liberation of Tibet in China, the actual control of the eastern section was
gradually advanced from the traditional custom line to the so-called McMahon
Line. In the middle and western sections, until 1959, apart from the individual
locations, the actual control scope of both China and India was basically in
line with traditional customary lines. Although the Indian side occupied more
than 90,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory in the eastern section, and
in 1959 provoked two border conflicts and demanded a large territory from
China, the Chinese government has always advocated the peaceful settlement of
the Sino-Indian border issue through negotiations. Before the peaceful
resolution, respect for the actual control of both sides, neither party should
change the border situation by one-sided action.
